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Non Technical Summary
Active labour market programmes haven been extensively used during the East
German transformation process. Between 1990 and 2002 the Federal Employment
Office (‘Bundesanstalt für Arbeit‘) spent approximately 138 billion EURO for ALMP
in East Germany. During this period of time 6.5 million workers participated in public
sponsored training or job creation schemes, which corresponds approximately with the
current number of employees. Since the mid-1990s there is some empirical evidence
on the effects of East German active labour market policy (ALMP), especially job
creation schemes (JCS) and public training measures (PT). Most of these studies are
based on microeconomic approaches, i.e. they evaluate the direct effects for the
participants in comparison to a control group of non-participants. Given that suitable
data are available, the advantage of micro studies is the possibility of detailed
estimation of heterogeneous effects for different sub-populations. The majority of
available microeconometric evaluation studies indicate no positive or even negative
effects of PT and JCS schemes on the future employment prospects of participants in
comparison to a suitable control group. 
However, a fundamental assumption in micro studies is that the non-participants are
not affected by the evaluated programme. The more extensive a measure is, the higher
is the probability of indirect employment effects on the non-participants. Therefore,
microeconomic evaluation of ALMP can only estimate the gross effects of the
measures for the participants. Since ALMPs are implemented to a large scale in East
Germany, indirect effects are likely to be significant. Macroeconometric evaluation
studies can take the indirect effects into account and may estimate the net effects of
ALMP. 
Aggregate evaluation studies are associated with a fundamental methodical problem.
ALMP cannot be treated as exogenous with respect to the local labour market
condition. This has to be taken into account in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of
the local effect of ALMP.
In this paper the three largest ALMP programmes – job creation schemes (JCS),
structural adjustment schemes (SAS), and public sponsored training (PT) – are
evaluated.
The analysis of the regional allocation rule of the funding of ALMPs reveals that
ALMP cannot be treated as exogenous: The allocation depends on the regional labour
market situation, i.e. those regions with the worst situation obtain the most funding.
This makes the use of suitable econometric approaches dealing with this simultaneity
problem essential
Three different approaches are presented in this paper: (1) an augmented matching
function which evaluates the effects of ALMPs on regional matching efficiency
(inflows into regular employment), (2) a reduced-form approach based on the
Beveridge curve, which assesses the effects on the regional job seeker rate (the
unemployment rate plus the participants in ALMP), and (3) a regional labour demand.
Two different regional data sets for the period of 1997 until 2002 are used. 
The augmented matching function indicates negative effects of JCS on matching
efficiency (inflows into regular employment) and no significant effects of PT and SAS.
This result is in line with available microeconometric research. The augmented
Beveridge curve approach does not indicate any long-term effects of ALMPs on
regional job-seeker rates. The labour demand estimation indicates that PT has no
effects on employment and JCS even leads to crowding-out of regular employment.
Three Approaches to the Evaluation of Active Labour Market
Policy in East Germany Using Regional Data*
Tobias Hagen
Abstract
Using different regional data sources for East Germany the three largest
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ALMPs and the fundamental simultaneity problem in macroeconomic
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ables are discussed. Three different approaches based on different
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are applied. An augmented matching function indicates a negative effect of
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and no significant effects of PT and SAS. A reduced form approach based
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21 Introduction
Active labour market policy has been extensively implemented during the East Ger-
man transformation process. Between 1990 and 2002 6.5 million workers participated
in public training or job creation schemes. Since the mid-1990s there is some empirical
evidence on the effects of East German active labour market policy (ALMP), espe-
cially job creation schemes and public training measures. Most of these studies are
based on microeconomic approaches, i.e. they evaluate the direct effects for the par-
ticipants in comparison to a control group of non-participants (average treatment effect
of the treated).1 If suitable data are available, micro studies can reveal detailed hetero-
geneous effects for different sub-populations.2
A fundamental assumption in micro studies is the stable unit treatment value as-
sumption (RUBIN, 1980): the labour market situation of the control group consisting of
non-participants is not affected by the evaluated programme. The more extensive a
measure is, the higher is the probability of indirect employment effects on the non-
participants. Therefore microeconomic evaluation of ALMP can only estimate the
gross effects of the measures for the participants and the results may be biased by the
violation of the mentioned assumption (see HECKMAN et al., 1999). Since in East
Germany large-scale ALMP programmes are implemented, indirect effects are likely
to be significant. Macroeconometric evaluation studies can take the indirect effects
into account and may estimate the net effect of ALMP.3 In this paper the three largest
active labour market policy programmes – job creation schemes (JCS), structural ad-
justment schemes (SAS), and public training measures (PT) – are evaluated. JCS and
SAS are subsidised jobs, mostly implemented in the non-profit sector.
The majority of available mircoeconometric evaluation studies indicate no positive
or even negative effects of PT and JCS schemes on the future employment prospects
of participants in comparison to a suitable control group (see HUJER and CALIENDO,
2001; HAGEN and STEINER, 2000). In a new study using large administrative data sets
HUJER et al. (2003) cannot detect any positive employment effects for any sub-
population of participants in JCS.
The fundamental evaluation problem in macroeconometric evaluation studies is that
ALMP is likely to be an endogenous variable. Local labour market offices may raise
their expenditures on ALMP if the labour market situation becomes worse. Therefore,
methods dealing with this simultaneity problem have to be applied in order to identify
the effect of ALMPs.
The effects found in previous studies using regional data are mixed.4 Some of the re-
sults are, however, likely to be affected by the methodological problems mentioned
                                                          
1 Surveys for German studies are for example HUJER and CALIENDO (2001) as well as HAGEN and
STEINER (2000). The current state of the macroeconomic literature is also presented in FERTIG et al.
(2002).  Surveys on international experiences on ALMPs can be found in MARTIN (2000),  HECKMAN et
al. (1999), FAY (1996) and STEINER and HAGEN (2002).
2 See for example LECHNER (2001) as well as HECKMAN et al. (1997).
3 Other approaches which are suitable to take into account indirect effects are general equilibrium models
(see HECKMAN et al., 1999).
4 See BÜTTNER and PREY (1998); STEINER et al. (1998); SCHMID et al. (2001); HAGEN and STEINER
(2000), BLIEN et al. (2002) and FERTIG et al. (2002). For surveyes see the references cited in footnote 1.
3above. One should keep in mind that macroeconometric evaluation is in comparison to
microeconometric evaluation still in its infancy from a methodological point of view.5
Therefore this paper tries to make also a methodological contribution to this topic.
Three different approaches are presented in this paper: (1) an augmented matching
function which evaluates the effects of ALMPs on regional matching efficiency, (2) a
reduced-form approach based on the Beveridge curve which assesses the effects on the
regional job seeker rate (the unemployment rate plus the participants in ALMP) and
(3) a regional labour demand. The econometric analysis is performed with two-stage
least square estimators based on first-differenced variables as well as GMM dynamic
panel data estimators.
The paper is structured as follows: After a brief description of the institutional back-
ground in the next section, effects of ALMP are discussed and possible empirical
strategies for their analysis are derived in section 3. Section 4 describes the regional
data sets used. Section 5 includes an analysis of the regional allocation rule of funding
for ALMPs, the detailed specifications, the estimation techniques, and the results of
the three approaches. Finally, section 6 discusses the results and draws conclusions.
2 Institutional Background: Active Labour Market Programmes in
East Germany
Between 1990 and 2002 the Federal Employment Office (‘Bundesanstalt für Arbeit‘)
spent approximately 138 billion EURO for ALMP in East Germany.6 During this pe-
riod of time 6.5 million workers participated in public training measures or job crea-
tion schemes. This corresponds approximately with the number of employees at the
present (see Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2003). This enormous amount of ALMP has
been seen as necessary in order to support the transformation process and to avoid un-
due social hardship resulting from the high and increasing unemployment in East
Germany. The most important measures have been public training (‘geförderte berufli-
che Weiterbildung’, PT) and subsidised employment, consisting of job creation
schemes (‘Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen’, JCS) and structural adjustment schemes
(‘Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen’, SAS) (see Table 1).
                                                                                                                                                                                    
An extensive survey on the Swedish experiences can be found in CALMFORS et al. (2001). Sweden is an
interesting example since it has traditionally implemented large-scale ALMP programmes.
5 “The problem of indirect effects poses a major challenge to conventional micro methods used in
evaluation research that focus on direct impacts instead of total impacts, and demonstrates the need for
program evaluation to utilize market-wide data and general equilibrium methods.” (HECKMAN et al.,
1999: 2035).
6 The unification of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Federal Demo-
cratic Republic (West Germany) took place in October 1990.
4Table 1: Unemployment Rates and ALMP, 1991 - 2001 (percentages)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Unemployment Rate West 6.3 6.6 8.2 9.2 9.3 10.1 11.0 10.5 9.9 8.7 8.3
Unemployment Rate East 10.3 14.8 15.8 16.0 14.9 16.9 19.5 19.5 19.0 18.8 18.9
Registered Vacancies East 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9
JCS East 2.1 4.9 3.2 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.0 1.6
SAS East 0.3 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.1 2.3 2.5 1.4 0.9
PT East 3.2 6.2 5.2 3.6 3.6 3.3 2.6 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9
Notes: Annual averages. JCS, SAS, PT are stocks of corresponding participants divided by total la-
bour force.
Source: Federal Employment Office.
The objective of PT is to increase the employability of the unemployed and the em-
ployment stability of employees at risk of becoming unemployed by enhancing the
human capital of the participants. The costs of the training measures are paid by the
employment office. Furthermore participants receive an assistance which depends on
the previous net income and is approximately equal to the unemployment benefit (see
the remarks of the German unemployment compensation below).
JCS are subsidised jobs mostly in non-profit organisations. One principle of JCS is
that their projects should be ‘additional’, i.e. not performed by regular firms. The aim
of this regulation is to minimise displacement effects. JCS are temporary employment
relationships especially for former long-term unemployed. The duration is normally 12
months, but can be prolonged to 36 months in special cases. The wage subsidy paid to
the employing institution is between 30 and 100 per cent. The wages paid to the par-
ticipants are equal to the wages according to collective agreements in corresponding
jobs. Since, however, the relevance of collective wage agreements has decreased in
East Germany, the remuneration in JCS is likely to be often higher than in regular
jobs.
The second important wage subsidy scheme is SAS. The main difference to JCS is
that it is more often carried out by the private sector and that employees at risk of be-
coming unemployed can participate as well. The subsidy is up to the average amount
of unemployment benefit including social security contributions paid in Germany. The
duration is normally up to 36 months. It can be extended to 48 months if the employer
guarantees to offer the participants a regular job afterwards.
Participants in all ALMP programmes are not registered as unemployed and there-
fore reduce the rate of open unemployment. Furthermore, participants in JCS and SAS
are registered as employed covered by the social security. Participating in JCS and SAS
qualifies for the eligibility of unemployment benefit.
The effective duration of the measures is on average much shorter than the potential
duration reported above. In 1999 JCS lasted on average 8.3 months. The average dura-
tion of PT and SAS was 8.4 months and 9.8 months, respectively (see HUJER et al.
2002).
 The German system of unemployment compensation consists of two parts, unem-
ployment benefit (‘Arbeitslosengeld’, henceforth UB) and unemployment assistance
(‘Arbeitslosenhilfe’, henceforth UA). Unemployed persons receive UB if they were
employed at least for 12 months within the previous three years. The amount of the
5monthly UB is 60% (67% for people with children) of the previous net wage. The en-
titlement period depends on the age and the previous employment duration and goes
up to 32 months for older workers. If an unemployed person is not entitled to UB or if
the UB is exhausted, UA is available. The requirement is 5 months of employment
during the previous 4 years. UA amount to 53% (57% for people with children) of pre-
vious the net wage, whereas, in principle, it can be drawn indefinitely. UA payments
are, however, under certain circumstances reduced by other incomes of the unem-
ployed person as well as earnings of family members within limits.
3 Possible Effects of Active Labour Market Policy and Empirical
Strategies
Besides potential effects of ALMPs at the level of participants in comparison to the
hypothetical situation of non-participation (approximated by a suitable control group),
effects at the macroeconomic level have to be taken into account.7
An extensive theoretical framework for the effects of ALMP has been developed by
CALMFORS (1994) (see also CALMFORS and SKEDINGER, 1995 and CALMFORS et al.,
2001).  The effects can be summarised as follows (see also HUJER et al. 2002): (1) ef-
fects on the matching process, (2) effects on the productivity of participants, (3) effects
on wage-formation and (4) effects on labour supply.8 Furthermore there may occur
negative indirect effects on non-participants.
In the terminology of CALMFORS (1994) the following negative indirect effects may
arise. Substitution effects occur if jobs created for subsidised workers (participants)
replace regular workers because relative wage costs or productivity have changed. If
substitution effects prevail, ALMP does not increase the scale but change the compo-
sition of outflow from unemployment. Therefore, substitution effects redistribute em-
ployment opportunities without increasing the level of employment.9 Note that substi-
tution effects may occur also in the public sector where especially municipal authori-
ties have an incentive to substitute regular employment by subsidised workers (‘fiscal
substitution effect’). Displacement effects occur if jobs created by a programme are at
the expense of other jobs, e.g. by distortions on good markets. For example, goods
produced by subsidised public employment may lead to distortion of competition and
may therefore displace regular employment.10 It is called a deadweight effect, if an
employer hires a subsidised worker, whom he had also hired in the absence of the
measure. Since the expenditures for ALMP have to be financed, there are also tax ef-
fects. Taxes, or more important for the German case, social security contributions,11
can influence e.g. the labour-supply, labour-demand, or wage-setting behaviour. Since
                                                          
7 Note that macroeconomic level means here the local labour market as well as the aggregate nation-wide
labour market.
8 Another effect mentioned by CALMFORS et al. (2001) is on the allocation of the work force between
sectors.
9 Note that the redistribution of employment prospects may be an objective for policy makers (see the
discussion in JOHNSON and TOMOLA, 1977).
10 For example, there has been a great deal of debate about whether JCS in horticulture and landscaping
(Garten- und Landschaftsbau) lead to crowding out of private firms in East Germany.
11 In Germany labour market policy is mainly financed by social security contributions.
6there is no regional variation in social security contributions and only a relatively
small time dimension, tax effects cannot be identified in the following empirical
analyses.
Labour-supply may be increased by ALMP, since discouragement-effects due to un-
employment are probably mitigated. Furthermore, programmes may encourage people
being out-of-labour force and especially women to re-enter the labour market by par-
ticipating for example in training measures. Furthermore, the fact that participating in
JCS and SAS qualifies for UB keeps the unemployed in contact with the labour office
after the participation. A positive labour supply effect within a region may be caused
by reduced regional mobility due to ALMP, which may be particularly important for
East Germany.12 However, by normalising all dependent variables in the following
empirical analyses by the size of the labour force, labour-supply effects are not ad-
dressed.
The productivity of (former) participants may be increased by formal training (PT) or
learning-on-the job (JCS or SAS).  Thus, at the regional level average productivity of
the work force may be increased which may lead under certain assumptions to an in-
crease in labour demand (see CALMFORS et al. 2001). Of course, at given wages, also
non-participants may be just substituted by (former) participants.
There are at least three potential channels how ALMP may affect wage-formation.
First, if wage-formation depends on open unemployment, ALMP decreases the wage-
moderating effect of high unemployment. Second, ALMP reduces the welfare differ-
ences between having and not having a job by paying participants higher incomes than
unemployed non-participants, by improving the psychological well-being of partici-
pants in comparison to non-participation, by improving future labour market prospects,
and by allowing participants to renew their eligibility for unemployment compensa-
tion. The reduced welfare difference may increase wage pressure at the individual
level (efficiency wages) as well as at the collective level (bargaining models). Third, if
the productivity of participants is increased and discouragement effects are mitigated,
the relative reemployment probabilities of the outsiders (e.g. long-term unemployed
participating in a measure) are increased which leads to a reduction of insider power
and, therefore, a moderation of wage pressure. A potential approach to the evaluation
of the wage-formation effects of ALMP is to estimate an augmented wage curve. This
is for example applied in PANNENBERG and SCHWARZE (1996) who detect a wage
moderating effect of PT in East Germany. Here wage effects are not explicitly evalu-
ated but they are, nevertheless, part of the net effects estimated.
 Raising the efficiency of the matching process is usually regarded as the main aim of
ALMP. At constant labour demand employment may be raised by an increase of
matching efficiency. This can be reached by (1) increasing the search intensity of
(former) participants, (2) by adjusting the human capital of job searchers to the re-
quirement of labour demand, and (3) by improving the signals of job searchers. Micro-
econometric studies cast doubt particularly on an increased search intensity due to
ALMPs. It has been frequently found, that participants get locked-in, i.e. they reduce
                                                          
12 Since the unification in 1990 there has been significant migration from East to West Germany which is
prevalently labour market driven. An often made statement is that ALMP may prevent laggard East
German regions from “bleeding to death”.
7their effort to find a regular job while they participate in the programme in comparison
to the control group of non-participants (see for example BERGEMANN et al., 2000 as
well as HUJER et al., 2003). This negative locking-in effect has to be over-
compensated by positive employment effects due to the participation in the pro-
gramme (see VAN OURS, 2002). In order to evaluate the effects of ALMPs on the
matching efficiency, one can make use of the well-known matching function, which
explains the number of matches (inflows into regular employment) with the number of
job searchers and vacancies (see PETRONGOLO and PISSARIDES, 2001). Specifying a
matching technology and augmenting the function by variables representing ALMPs,
it is possible to evaluate the effect of ALMPs on the matching efficiency (see BOERI
and BURDA, 1996 and BELLMANN and JACKMAN, 1996). The matching efficiency may
be expressed as a shift-parameter of the Beveridge curve: An increase in the matching
efficiency means an increase in inflows into regular employment, given the matching
technology, the stock of the vacancies and the stock of job searchers. This approach is
used in the analysis in section 5.2.
As mentioned above, ALMP may induce crowding-out of regular employment. The
estimated effect of ALMPs within an augmented matching function already includes
substitution effects which reflect the possibility that employers hire a (former) partici-
pant instead of a non-participant, but it does not include effects which are based on the
possibility that regular workers are fired to be replaced by subsidised workers or that
distortions at the good markets induce plant closures. In order to obtain these effects
one can focus on stocks. A reduced form approach which includes all the effects may
be interpreted as an augmented Beveridge curve as proposed by CALMFORS and
SKEDINGER (1995) and HUJER et al. (2002). This approach – presented in section 5.3 –
regresses the regional job seeker rate (which is the unemployment rate plus participant
rates in ALMPs) on the regional vacancy rate, structural variables describing the re-
gional labour market, as well as variables for the ALMPs. Although the estimated ef-
fect of ALMP will include all indirect effects, the augmented Beveridge curve has the
drawback to be a reduced form approach, which means that it is something of a “black
box”, i.e. it is unclear which of the effects discussed above drive the results.
A more structural approach for the assessment of crowding-out effects is to estimate
a labour demand equation for regular labour. Most favourable would it be to estimate a
heterogeneous labour demand with subsidised workers or former participants as one
type of labour. This would enable the researcher to estimate substitution elasticities
between different input factors and, therefore, to obtain a comprehensive pattern of the
range of substitution and displacement effects.13 This is, however, due to data limita-
tions not possible here.14  In section 5.4 a homogeneous regional labour demand for
regular employment augmented by variables for ALMP is estimated.
                                                          
13 To the best of my knowledge there is no study available yet, evaluating the effects of ALMP within a
heterogeneous labour demand framework.
14 Another possibility is to estimate the effect of ALMP on labour demand using matching estimators and
firm level data. Using this approach HUJER, CALIENDO and RADIC (2002) cannot find any positive long-
run effect of subsidised employment on firms‘ employment level for West Germany.
84 Data Sets
There are two different data sources used in the econometric analyses: First, local em-
ployment office area (LEOA) (‘Arbeitsamtsbezirke’) data and, second, district (‘Re-
gierungskreise’) data.
The LEOA data are available on a monthly basis from December 1998 up to January
2003.15 Due to data availability, Berlin (including the former West Berlin) is pooled
into one district. It seems to be reasonable to treat Berlin as one regional labour mar-
ket. This implies 35 regional units. These monthly data are used for the Beveridge
curve approach presented in section 5.3.
The dependent variable in the Beveridge curve approach is the job seeker rate which
is defined as the sum of the registered unemployed plus the participants in ALMPs
(here JCS, PT, SAS and two smaller wage subsidy schemes16) relative to total labour
force. In line with the literature the ALMP variables are defined as accomodation ra-
tios, i.e. the participants in the measure of interest relative to the sum of the open un-
employed and the participants in ALMP (see CALMFORS and SKEDINGER, 1995). Thus
the accomodation ratios indicate the proportion of all unemployed who participate in
the particular measure. Another variable used in the estimation is the number of short-
time workers. Some descriptive statistics of these variables for the estimation sample
can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. It can be seen that the JSR is much higher
than the rate of open unemployment. In some local areas even one third of the total
labour force are job searchers and one fifth of all job searchers are participants in JCS.
 For the augmented matching function in section 5.2 the monthly LEOA data have to
be pooled into quarterly data, since the dependent variable ‘inflows into employment’
is only available for quarters. The data covers the time period between the first quarter
in 1999 and the first quarter in 2002. The dependent variable is corrected for the in-
flows into ALMPs (JCR and SAS) in order to obtain inflows into ‘regular employ-
ment’. All variables are normalised by local labour force. Some descriptive statistics of
important variables in the estimation sample can be found in Table A2 in the Appen-
dix. It can be seen that during a quarter there are 4.7 inflows into employment per 100
persons in the total labour force. 5.5 per cent of these inflows are into JCS or SAS. In
order to obtain additional (instrumental) variables district data are merged to the
LEOA data. In most cases direct matches are possible. Otherwise the data are merged
weighted with weights depending on population size. By doing this information on
political elections at the district level and welfare recipients can be used for the analy-
ses.
For the labour demand estimation in section 5.4 district level data are used.17 This
data set is available for the 114 East German districts for 1996 until 2000. Berlin has
to be excluded since not all variables are available. Furthermore, due to administrative
                                                          
15 These data can be downloaded from the homepage of the Federal Employment Office at
www.arbeitsamt.de.
16 The schemes are called „Beschäftigungshilfen für Langzeitarbeitslose“ and „Eingliederungszuschüsse“.
17 The district level data are obtained from three sources: (1) the ‘Bundesministerium für Bauwesen und
Raumordnung “Aktuelle Daten zur Entwicklung der Städte, Kreise und Gemeinden”’ , (2) ‘Bundesamt
für Bauwesen und Raumordnung “INKAR – Indikatoren zur Raumentwicklung”’ and (3) the Institute of
Employment Research (IAB) at the Federal Employment Office.
9changes in the district structure, some districts have to be aggregated which leads to a
reduction to 101 districts.18 Unfortunately, SAS is not available for 1996. Therefore it
is excluded from the analysis. In the econometric analyses employment and the meas-
ures of ALMP are normalised by total labour force. Some descriptive statistics can be
found in Table A3 in the Appendix.
5 Econometric Analysis
As mentioned above, the results of three different approaches to the evaluation of
ALMPs are presented in this section. First of all, in the next subsection, the crucial
issue of the endogeneity of ALMP and possible instrumentation strategies are dis-
cussed.
5.1 Endogeneity of Active Labour Market Policy and Potential Instrumental
Variables
The fundamental problem in macroeconomic evaluation studies is that ALMP cannot
be treated as strictly exogenous since it may depend on the contemporaneous or lagged
labour market situation. This would lead to a correlation of the ALMP variables with
the error term and consequently to inconsistent estimates of the effects. The usual so-
lution is to apply instrumental variable estimators. In the following, it is shown that,
due to the allocation rule of the funding, ALMP has to be interpreted as endogenous
with respect to the local labour market situation.
Generally, ALMP is implemented by local employment offices (‘Arbeitsämter’) even
if the funding comes from the Federal Employment Office (‘Bundesanstalt für Ar-
beit’). There is another level in between the local employment offices and the federal
employment office, the so-called regional employment offices (‘Landesarbeitsämter’).
The regional employment offices correspond approximately to the federal states
(‘Bundesländer’), even though in some cases more than one federal state is assigned to
a regional employment office.
The allocation of the funding of ALMPs on the local employment offices is pre-
dominantly based on regional and local labour market factors (see BLIEN, 2002;
FERTIG and SCHMIDT, 2000). In the first step the total funding is determined by the
Federal Employment Office (‘Bundesanstalt für Arbeit’) for one year. This is of course
influenced by government decisions. The funding is divided into two approximately
equal parts for East and West Germany, respectively. Afterwards, the allocation on
regional employment offices depends on (1) the change in regional employment, (2)
the regional job seeker rate, (3) the regional proportion of unemployed with low
reemployment probabilities (long-term unemployed, older, disabled), and (4) the num-
ber of exits from unemployment into regular employment. Furthermore, in order to
guarantee a certain “steadiness” of ALMP the current funding depends on the funding
                                                          
18 The following towns that became administered as a district in its own right during the period had to be
aggregated with their surrounding areas: Chemnitz, Plauen, Mittweida, Zwickau, Dresden, Meißen,
Kamenz, Leipzig, Delitzsch.
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of the previous year. In the third step regional employment offices allocate the funding
on local employment offices using similar local labour market indicators. Especially
after the introduction of the new employment promotion in the Social Code (Sozialge-
setzbuch III; SGB) in January 1998 the local employment offices have been to a large
extent autonomous in their implementation of ALMPs (see FERTIG and SCHMIDT,
2000).
The presented allocation rule implies that ALMP is indeed endogenous with respect
to the regional and local labour market situation which implies that treating ALMP as
an exogenous variable in empirical analyses will yield inconsistent results.
The Relationship between the local job seeker rate and ALMP is depicted in Figure 1
and Figure 2. Based on non-parametric regressions (see HÄRDLE, 1991) and monthly
LEOA data, it is shown that the proportion of participants in labour force increases
with the JSR (Figure 1). An increase in the JSR is associated with a stronger increase
in JCS than in PT. This becomes more obvious when looking on the association be-
tween the JSR and accomodation ratios (proportion of job seeker participating in a
certain measure) in Figure 2. Equivalent figures can also be shown for the relation-
ships between ALMP and the other outcome measures (inflows into regular employ-
ment and level of regular employment). These are not depicted for lack of space.
 Figure 1: Relationship between the job seeker rate and ALMP (participants relative to
the labour force) – Results of nonparametric regressions
Notes: Bivariate Nadaraya-Watson estimator with an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of
0.02, based on 1,750 observations (35 LEOAs, Dec. 1998 – Jan. 2003).
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Figure 2: Relationship between the job seeker rate and ALMP (acccomodation ratios)
– Results of nonparametric regressions
Notes: See Figure 1.
All the indicators of the allocation rule are obviously no suitable instrumental vari-
ables since they are correlated or even identical with the dependent variables in the
econometric analysis. Potential instruments may be variables which influence the dis-
cretionary decisions of local authorities and employment offices (see BÜTTNER and
PREY, 1998). Such instrumental variables which have been partly used in the literature
are political factors, the proportion of welfare recipients, (at least in the short-run) the
structure of the labour force and the national unemployment and vacancy rate.
It is often stated that parties on the political Left have a stronger preference for
ALMP than liberal-conservative parties (see for example CALMFORS and SKEDINGER,
1995; BÜTTNER and PREY, 1998). Regional governments have the possibility to pro-
mote the implementation of measures through several channels (see PREY, 1999).
Therefore, in this paper the proportion of votes for liberal-conservative parties (CDU
and FDP) is used as an instrument.19
The proportion of welfare recipients may be correlated with ALMP (especially JCS
and SAS) since local political authorities have an incentive to ‘transform’ welfare re-
cipients which are funded by the local community into participants of labour market
programmes and afterwards recipients of unemployment benefit (see FEIST and
SCHÖB, 2000). ALMP as well as unemployment benefit is funded by the federal em-
ployment office. This incentive has also been described for Belgium (see COCKX and
RIDDER, 2001).
                                                          
19 CDU refers to the “Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands” and FDP to the “Freie Demokra-
tische Partei Deutschlands”.
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The national unemployment rate may be a valid instrument for two reasons. First, it
is one central variable for the government which determines judgement by the voters.
The government has the possibility to decrease the open unemployment rate in the
short-run just by the fact that participants in ALMPs are not defined as unemployed.
Thus it may raise it’s funding for ALMP if open unemployment increases.20 Second,
given the restricted budget of the federal employment office, an increase in unem-
ployment may also lead to a reduction of ALMP spending in the region concerned if
its increase in unemployment is lower. This tendency is strengthened by the fact that
rising national unemployment rates lead to rising spending for passive labour market
policies (unemployment benefit and assistance, short-term work etc.). The influence of
a single East German region on national variables is negligible. Furthermore, the vari-
able is lagged in order to avoid any simultaneity problems.
The national vacancy rate may serve as a business cycle indicator. A reduction in the
national vacancy rate may again cause the government to increase ALMP spendings.
The structure of the local labour force may influence the implementation of different
ALMP measures on the local level since particular programmes are only suitable for
special groups.
5.2 Augmented Matching Function – Effects on Matching Efficiency
The aggregate matching function assumes that the outflow from unemployment in em-
ployment (new matches) itH  in region i and period t is a function m of the number of
unemployed job searchers itU  and the number of vacancies itV
 ,      >0,   >0 it it it it U VH A m U V m m      (1)
with itA  representing a mismatch parameter which may vary over time and over re-
gions (see PETRONGOLO and PISSARIDES, 2001 for a survey).
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas function for m, taking logarithm on both sides and taking
some random variations in matching into account, (1) can be reformulated as a regres-
sion equation
1 2it it it i ith u v t S                 (2)
with the lower case denoting the natural logarithm. Furthermore the variables are nor-
malised by total labour force  lnit it ith H L .
21 The mismatch parameter itA  is decom-
posed into  ln it i itA t S       , with i  denoting a regional fixed-effect on the
                                                          
20 The political economy of active labour market policy is discussed in CALMFORS (1995). He formulates
a game between government and wage-setters which leads to the problem of time-inconsistency which
is well-known from the theory of monetary policy. Since the government cannot credibly announce low
spending for ALMP wages are set above the market clearing level. If one assumes that a conservative
party has a lower weight for open unemployment in its loss function, the commitment outcome can be
obtained also under discretion.
21 As shown by MÜNICH, SVEJNAR and TERRELL (1998), not taking into account the size of the local units
leads to biased estimation due to the intercorrelations among the variables, termed “spurious scale ef-
fect” by the authors.
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matching efficiency, t  is a deterministic time trend which accounts for changes in
matching efficiency over time which is common to all regions, S  denotes a vector of
seasonal (quarterly) dummies, and it is a classical error term. From a theoretical point
of view it is an interesting question whether the estimated parameters are conform with
constant return to scale (see PISSARIDES, 2000). This can be tested by defining the null
hypothesis as 1 2 1   .
In order to incorporate ALMPs into the matching function the implicit assumption of
a homogeneous pool of job searchers is relaxed and search effectiveness is included
into the matching function (see LEHMANN, 1995 and PUHANI, 1999). After rearranging
(2),  one gets the following equation (see also BOERI and BURDA, 1996 and
BELLMANN and JACKMAN, 1996):
1 2 3
1 2 3 4 5 6it it it it it it it i ith u v Z p p p t S                      (3)
with itZ  denoting variables affecting the search effectiveness of the job searchers
(structure of the unemployed and the labour force) and 1itp , 2itp , 3itp  the (logarithm of
the) stock of participants in three different ALMP programmes (JCS, SAS, PT) nor-
malised by total labour force. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table A2 in the
Appendix.
In practice, all explanatory variables are set to the begin of the period t, i.e. the end of
period t-1.22  The time lag of the effect of the ALMP is ex ante unknown. Since the
average duration of the ALMPs analysed is between 8 and 10 months, the ALMPs
variables are lagged up to 4 quarters.
4 4 41 2 3
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 , 5 , 6 ,1 1 1
      
it it it it k i t k k i t k k i t kk k k
i it
h u v Z p p p
t S
     
   
     
  
     
   
      (4)
Running this regression on the data set used is associated with some problems, which
are well-known in the empirical literature (see PETRONGOLO and PISSARIDES, 2001).
First, the dependent variable ith  does include all inflows into regular employment and
not only the inflows from unemployment. Although this definition of ith is well-suited
for the analysis here,23 equation (4) does not correspond to the traditional matching
function. Second, the vacancy rate v  includes only the registered vacancies at the em-
ployment office and is therefore systematically underreported (see FRANZ and
SMOLNY, 1994). Nevertheless, in the absence of better data the reported vacancies may
serve as a proxy for the actual vacancies. Third, the registered unemployment rate itu
disposes of the well-known under- and over-reporting bias: people not seeking for jobs
but being registered are counted as unemployed while the ones seeking for jobs but not
being registered as unemployed are called not unemployed. Especially when inter-
preting the estimated 1  and 2  these issues should be kept in mind.
                                                          
22 Otherwise all variables would be endogenous with respect to ith .
23 This ensures that inflows from programmes are included. Furthermore, the possibility of substitution
effects with regular on-the-job searchers is taken into account.
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In order to eliminate the regional-specific effect i , equation (4) is estimated in first
differences. First-differencing is superior to fixed-effects in this application since it
allows to use lagged values of variables which are not strictly exogenous as instru-
ments. This is not a valid solution in fixed-effects models since the fixed-effects trans-
formation leads to correlation of the error term with the time-demeaned instruments
(see WOOLDRIDGE, 2002: 310).24
An essential issue is to control for dynamics, i.e. to include lagged dependent vari-
ables ( 1ith  ) as regressors. Due to the small sample size (N=35; T=8 in the preferred
specification) the usual GMM estimator by ARRELANO and BOND (1991) or
BLUNDELL and BOND (1998) seems not to be feasible (see also the discussion in
HUJER et al. 2002). Using the inefficient ANDERSON and HSIAO (1981) two stage least
square first-difference estimator, the null hypothesis of the coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable is equal to zero, cannot be rejected.25 Therefore, unlike the ap-
proaches presented in the next sub-sections there is no lagged dependent variable in-
cluded in the following. This, however, may lead to two problems. The falsely omitted
lagged dependent variable may induce omitted variable bias. Furthermore, it may in-
duce serial correlation which violates the use of lagged values of variables as instru-
ments. Therefore, tests on serial correlation are performed (see WOOLDRIDGE, 2002).
The endogeneity of the ALMP is taken into account by a two-stage least square pro-
cedure. The first step is estimated by a seemingly-unrelated regression (SUR), since
the analysed programmes are likely to be determined by the same or correlated unob-
served factors. Note that SUR estimation does not affect consistency, but efficiency of
the estimate (see BALTAGI, 2001).  Besides the instrumental variables all exogenous
variables of equation (4) are included, except for lagged vacancies. The reason is that
there may be – especially for SAS – anticipatory effects of firms’ behaviour with re-
gard to the reporting of vacancies: It is reasonable that firms report their vacancies to
the employment office with a higher probability if they want to hire a subsidised
worker. Therefore the vacancy rate may be correlated with the error term in the first
stage regression and is therefore omitted.26
The results of the first-stage regression are depicted in Table A4 in the Appendix.
The included linear time trend may control for the overall funding for ALMP as de-
termined by the Federal Employment Office. The funding especially for JCS and SAS
has been cut since 1999, which may be an explanation for the negative coefficients.
The interaction variable with the political votes may capture the differential effect of
the overall funding in different districts due to local governments. Furthermore, an
additional interaction term of the political power variable with proportion of welfare
recipients and the time trend controls for different concepts of political parties in their
labour market policy for welfare recipients. Note, that only those labour force vari-
ables are included which have been found to have no significant effects on inflows into
                                                          
24 The mean-deviation transformation for fixed-effects models leads to    it i it i it iy y x x        ,
with the bar indicating the mean over time for a region i. Consistency requires that
   0it i itE x x   .
25 Estimation results are available on request by the author
26 Indeed, the vacancy rate has a significantly positive effect on SAS but not on PT and JCS. Using this
instrumentation strategies does not change the estimated effects of ALMP in the second stage. These
estimation results are available on request by the author.
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regular employment. As an additional safeguard all instrumental variables are lagged
at least for one period.
The results of the matching function (second stage) are depicted in Table 2. Column
(1) includes an ordinary matching function consisting of the unemployment and the
vacancy rate as well as seasonal dummies and a linear time trend as explanatory vari-
ables. Constant returns to scale are clearly rejected. The evidence is more in favour for
increasing returns to scale. The coefficient of the time trend indicates decreasing
matching efficiency over time.  In column (2) the unemployment rate is decomposed
into the short- and long-term unemployment rate (less and more than six months of
unemployment, respectively). The short-term unemployment rate has a significantly
larger effect on the inflows into regular employment than the long-term unemployment
rate. This is compatible with negative duration dependence in the hazard rate into em-
ployment, often discussed in microeconometric unemployment duration analysis (see
MACHIN and MANNING, 1999). Negative duration dependence may, for example, be
caused by the assumption of a ranking of the unemployed corresponding with their
unemployment duration (see BLANCHARD and DIAMOND, 1994) or appreciation of
human capital. It is, however, well-known that the estimated result may be driven by
the structure of the unemployed and not by true duration dependence. Therefore, in
column (3) variables are included which have been found in microeconomic studies of
unemployment duration to have significant effects (see e.g. HUNT, 1995 and STEINER,
2001).27 The results indicate that the higher the proportion of UB recipients in the pool
of unemployment the lower the inflows into regular employment.28 This is in line with
basic job search theory and the results in most microeconomic studies on unemploy-
ment duration (see for example HUNT, 1995; STEINER, 1997; ATKINSON and
MICKLEWRIGT, 1991). In column (4) the (log) participants in ALMPs are included but
treated as exogenous. Now, constant returns to scale cannot be rejected. Finally, in
column (5) the ALMP variables are instrumented.29 The Hausman test indicates that
OLS in column (4) is inconsistent. The Sargan test does not reject the validity of the
instruments.
The estimated elasticities of the inflows into regular employment with respect to the
ALMP measures are summarised in Table 3. Treating the ALMPs variables as exoge-
nous yield no significant elasiticities. Instrumenting the ALMP variables leads to sig-
nificant negative effects of JCS. The cumulated elasticity after four quarters indicates
that an increase in the participants in JCS per labour force by one per cent leads to an
decrease of inflows into regular employment by approximately 0.95 per cent. Thus
JCS lead to a decline in regional matching efficieny. This result is compatible with the
negative results at the micro level (see HUJER et al., 2003). Additionally, there may be
negative indirect effects on the non-participants at the local labour market level.
                                                          
27 All other variables describing the structure of the unemployed and the labour force turned out to be
insignificant.
28 Data on UA are unfortunately not available.
29 The standard errors are adjusted for the fact that the ALMP variables are instrumented.
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Table 2: Estimation Results– Aggregate Matching Function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
with ALMPs (exog) with ALMPs (IV)
Variables Par. t-value
(robust)
Par. t-value
(robust)
Par. t-value
(robust)
Par. t-value
(robust)
Par. t-value
(robust)
ut-1 1.504 10.55 1.318 8.04 1.299 4.11 1.266 4.48
vt-1 0.216 6.55 0.210 6.37 0.205 6.21 0.187 4.02 0.182 4.03
Short-term unemployed (t-1) 1.444 9.44
Long-term unemployed (t-1) 0.428 3.19
Prop. of young in labour force (t-1) -1.528 -0.58 -5.530 -1.72 -13.027 -1.49
Prop. of older unempl. (t-1) -0.261 -0.28 -3.438 -2.57 -2.824 -2.15
Prop. of female unempl. (t-1) -2.112 -3.47 -2.281 -2.74 -1.315 -1.24
Prop. of foreign unempl. (t-1) -7.784 -1.43 -11.948 -1.76 -8.402 -1.08
Prop. of UB recipients   (t-1) -0.966 -1.94 -2.093 -2.73 -1.6524 -2.03
jcs (t-1) -0.015 -0.26 -0.178 -1.49
jcs (t-2) -0.095 -2.08 -0.373 -3.12
jcs (t-3) 0.096 2.43 -0.253 -2.21
jcs (t-4) 0.033 0.66 -.0142 -1.45
sas (t-1) 0.070 1.24 -0.235 -0.94
sas (t-2) 0.028 -0.51 -0.308 -0.87
sas (t-3) 0.021 0.36 -0.018 -0.07
sas (t-4) -0.033 -0.53 0.372 2.07
pt (t-1) 0.190 1.93 0.680 1.40
pt (t-2) 0.042 0.43 0.157 0.32
pt (t-3) 0.125 1.23 0.801 1.53
pt (t-4) -0.103 -0.94 0.631 1.91
Quarter 2 0.304 16.51 0.304 17.30 0.340 11.62 0.361 7.54 0.408 3.36
Quarter 3 -0.189 -10.03 -0.180 -9.65 -0.139 -4.53 -0.179 -3.67 -0.051 -0.43
Quarter 4 0.000 0.01 0.008 0.45 0.031 1.24 0.027 0.76 0.162 2.16
trend -0.017 -2.63 -0.025 -3.83 -0.028 -3.68 -0.021 -1.01 0.010 0.30
Constant Return to Scale, p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.1359 0.1211
H0: no serial correlation, p-value 0.1301 0.1402 0.1599 0.1806 0.1956
Hausman Test, p-value 0.034
Sargan Test, p-value 0.301
R2 0.8689 0.8724 0.8926 0.9084 0.9227
No. of observations (N, T) 35, 11 35, 11 35, 11 35, 8 35,8
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Table 3: Cumulated Elasticities of the Inflows into Regular Employment with Respect
to participants in ALMP (robust t-values in parentheses)
Treated as exogenous Instrumented
Cumulated effects JCS SAS PT JCS SAS PT
-0.002 0.089 0.175 -0.178 -0.235 0.680t-1
(-0.04) (1,58) (1.87) (-1.49) (-0.94) (1.40)
-0.090 0.080 0.230 -0.551 -0.543 0.836t-2
(-1.38) (1.13) (1.77) (-2.64) (-1.06) (0.94)
0.004 1.53 0.470 -0.804 -0.560 1.637t-3
(0.05) (1.86) (3.05) (-2.64) (-0.93) (1.26)
0.062 0.030 0.486 -0.947 -0.189 2.268t-4
(0.61) (0.28) (2,42) (-2.45) (-0.27) (1.49)
Notes: Calculated from the estimation results depicted in column (4) and (5) in Table 2.
5.3 Augmented Beveridge Curve – Effects on Job Seeker Rate
A Beveridge curve augmented by variables for ALMP may be derived as follows (see
also CALMFORS and SKEDINGER, 1995). In a steady state equilibrium the number of
separations equals the number of matches. Holding the separation rate constant and
rearranging (2) one obtains the regression equation (see NICKELL et al., 2002; WALL
and ZOEGA, 2002; FRANZ and SMOLNY, 1994; BÖRSCH-SUPAN, 1991)
it it i itu v t S         .    (5)
This equation can be augmented by ALMP and other variables affecting local unem-
ployment. ALMP variables are introduced by so called accommodation ratios as pro-
posed by CALMFORS and SKEDINGER (1995) 30
 lnJCS JCS JCS SAS PT othersit it it it it it itaccr P U P P P P    
and for SAS and PT accordingly. Using accomodation ratios may be a first attempt to
reduce the endogeneity problem of ALMP with respect to the unemployment rate.
In order to avoid “bookkeeping”-effects which are based on the fact that participants
are not registered as unemployed, the unemployment rate itu  is extended to the job
seeker rate by adding the stock of participants in ALMP
    ln ln JCS SAS PT othersit it it it it it it itjsr JSR U P P P P L      .
In order to allow for sluggish adjustment and lags in the effects of the ALMPs, a dy-
namic specification is used. It can be written as
                                                          
30 othersitP is the stock of participants in two smaller ALMP programmes. The schemes are called
„Beschäftigungshilfen für Langzeitarbeitslose“ and „Eingliederungszuschüsse“.
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       
 
1 2 3
1
                  
JCS SAS PT
it it it it
K
k
k it i it
k
C L jsr A L accr A L accr A L accr
B L x t S   

  
    
    (6)
by defining polynomials in the lag operator   2 121 2 121 ...C L c L c L c L     ,
  2 120 1 2 12...j j j j jA L a a L a L a L      and   2 60 1 2 6...k k k k kB L b b L b L b L     . j represents
the three programmes (JCS, SAS, PT). kitx  is a vector of k explanatory variables in-
cluding itv .
A similar specification using the same data base can be found in HUJER et al. (2002).
The main difference here is that monthly data instead of quarterly data are used, which
implies a time dimension of 50 observations for 35 LEOAs.31 This may lead to more
reasonable results and makes it possible to exploit the time dimension to achieve con-
sistency with the GMM dynamic panel data estimator (see JUDSON and OWEN, 1999).
Other differences are that a log-linear specification instead of a linear specification is
estimated and that some additional explanatory variables describing the local labour
market are included.
In order to get rid of the regional specific effects i , equation (6) is estimated in first
differences. For the estimation the GMM dynamic panel data estimator proposed by
ARELLANO and BOND (1991) is used and endogenous (ALMP) and pre-determined
variables are instrumented by its lagged levels.32 Furthermore, the inclusion of addi-
tional external instruments was checked. Since no possible instrumental variables
(variables on election results, welfare recipients) could significantly improve the Sar-
gan test statistic, they were not included and identification is based solely on lagged
levels.33 As pointed out by BOND (2002), using too many lagged levels as instrumental
variables may result in overfitting bias. JUDSON and OWEN (1999) show that using a
restricted number of instrumental variables does not reduce the performance of the
estimator. Therefore, not all possible lagged levels are used as instrumental variables,
and robustness checks with respect to the number of lagged levels are performed. The
number of instrumental variables for the ALMP variables is truncated at t-13 (12
lagged levels) and t-4 (three lagged levels), respectively.
Another issue is, whether to use one-step or the efficient two-step estimator. For a
large time series dimension (in comparison to the number of cross sections) JUDSON
and OWEN (1999) show that the one-step GMM estimator outperforms the two-step
estimator. Therefore, here only the one-step estimator (with robust standard errors) is
applied.
In equation (6) the vector kitx  includes the structure of the unemployed (proportion of
women, disabled, foreigner, and blue-collar workers34) as well as the proportion of
younger people in the labour force. Note that other variables describing the structure of
the labour force turned out to be insignificant. The one period lags of these variables
                                                          
31 HUJER et al. (2002) use 34 x 12 (N x T) observations.
32 HUJER et al. (2002) additionally apply the BLUNDELL and BOND (1998) system GMM estimator.
33 The difference in the Sargan test statistics in two models is asymptotically 2 distributed (see BOND,
2002).
34 The proportion of blue-collar workers may serve as a proxy for lower skilled workers. The proportion of
UB recipients turned out to be insignificant.
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are treated as predetermined.35 Some descriptive statistics can be found in Table A1
and A2 in the Appendix.
In addition, the vector kitx  includes the national unemployment and vacancy rate as
well as the regional vacancy rate. The regional vacancy rate is likely to be simultane-
ously determined with the regional unemployment rate. Thus also the one month
lagged regional vacancy rate is treated as predetermined, i.e. it is instrumented by
lagged levels. The lagged national vacancy and unemployment rate are treated as
strictly exogenous. In order to analyse a broader definition of regional unemployment
the number of short-time workers is added to the JSR in an alternative specification.36
With 50 months for each LEOA, there is a substantial time dimension. This may ren-
der nonstationarity to an important issue. Testing for nonstationarity and cointegration
in panel data has just recently became possible, due to methodological progress within
the last years.37 Nonstationarity may be for the used estimator by ARRELANO and
BOND (1991) a problem since the instrumentation strategy implies that lagged differ-
ences are regressed on lagged levels. In this paper augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root
tests as proposed by SARNO and TAYLOR (1998) and TAYLOR and SARNO (1998) are
performed. Under the null hypothesis the time series of all cross sections (LEOAs) are
nonstationary. The test should, however, be interpreted with care, due to the definition
of null hypothesis: If only one time series is stationary the null hypothesis is rejected.
Nevertheless, the test may be at least interpreted as first evidence against nonstation-
arity.38 The Dickey-Fuller regression is performed for one up to 12 lag orders. The re-
sults are depicted in Table A5 in the Appendix. For all variables and lag orders the null
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected.
The estimation results of equation (6) are depicted in Table A6 in the Appendix. The
Sargan tests come from the corresponding homoscedastic estimator since the asymp-
totic distribution is only valid in the case of i.i.d. errors (see ARRELANO and BOND,
1991: 290). The Sargan tests of all specifications indicate that the validity of the in-
strumental variables cannot be rejected. Also the tests on second order autocorrelation
in the residuals do not reject the null hypothesis in any specification. In column (1) the
preferred specification is depicted which uses 12 lagged levels as instrumental vari-
ables. In column (2) the number of short-time workers is included in jsr. In column (3)
only 3 lagged levels are used as instruments. The instrumentation strategy does hardly
change any coefficient.39
The interpretation of the estimated coefficients is, due to the lagged dependent and
explanatory variables, not straightforward. The elasticity of the job seeker rate with
respect to the stock of ALMP participants has to be calculated in the same manner as
in autoregressive distributed lag time-series models (see GREENE, 2000 and the expla-
                                                          
35 The proportion of specific groups in the pool of unemployed may be affected by the level of unem-
ployment.
36 Short-time work refers to the arrangements for working less than normal hours. In return for subsidies
by the employment office, employers agree to avoid redundancies.
37 See the Special Issue of the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics Vol. 61(4) in 1999.
38 The main motivation for testing for unit root in a panel instead of single time series is that the power of
the test increases with an increase in the number of cross-sections. TAYLOR and SARNO (1998) claim
that the test is much more powerful than the univariate Augmented Dickey Fuller test.
39 There were many more robustness checks performed. For example omitting some of the variables in kitx .
The results turn out to be quite robust.
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nation in HUJER et al., 2002). In Table 4 the cumulated elasticities are depicted for the
first 3 months (interpreted as ‘short-term effect’) and for the long-run effect. The asso-
ciated standard errors are calculated by the delta method (see GREENE, 2000).
It can be seen in Table 4 that there are significantly negative short-term effects of
SAS and PT but no significant effects in the long-run for any specification. Including
the short-time workers implies no noticeable change in the long-term effects. While
the insignificant cumulated long-term effect is in line with microeconometric studies,
the interpretation of the significantly negative three months short-term effect of SAS is,
given potential locking-in effects and the evidence from micro studies, unexpected.40
Somehow, comparable results are found in the aggregate study by HUJER et al. (2002)
for East Germany. A possible explanation is that employees at risk of becoming un-
employed may participate in SAS. The associated temporary decrease in average wage
costs at local labour markets may prevent or at least delay inflows into unemployment.
This hypothesis would also explain the stronger effect if short-time work is included in
the JSR: Short-time work can be prevented if the total wage costs are reduced by other
subsidises from the employment office.
Table 4: Cumulated elasticities of the JSR with respect to the ALMP accommodation
ratios (robust t-values in parentheses)
Dep.
variable
Number of lagged
levels as instruments
Accomo-
dation
Ratio
2th order
serial cor-
relation
(p-value)
Sargan Test
(p-value)
3 months
cumulated
effect
Long run
cumulated
effect
jsr JCS 0.001 -0.037
(0.16) (-0.68)
SAS 0.340
2(4685) =
1180.80 -0.024 -0.006
(-2.46) (-0.16)
PT -0.025 -0.008
lagged jsr and ALMP:
t-2, ..., t-13
itv : t-1, ..., t-12
k
itx : t-1, ..., t-9
(1.000)
(-1.59) (-0.08)
jsr JCS -0.004 -0.027
(-0.36) (-0.44)
SAS 0.744
2 (4685) =
1199.72 -0.042 -0.074
(-3.05) (-1.05)
incl.
short-
time
workers
PT -0.040 -0.072
lagged jsr and ALMP:
t-2, ..., t-13
itv : t-1, ..., t-12
k
itx : t-1, ..., t-9
(1.000)
-(2.83) (-0.72)
jsr JCS 0.001 -0.037
(0.12) (-0.64)
SAS 0.340
2(2244) =
1180.80 -0.020 -0.006
(-2.46) (-0.14)
PT -0.024 -0.008
lagged jsr and ALMP:
t-2, ..., t-4
itv : t-1, ..., t-3
k
itx : t-1, ..., t-3
(1.000)
(-1.59) (-0.07)
Notes: Calculated from the estimation results depicted in Table A6 in the Appendix. The number of
internal instruments is with respect to the lagged dependent variable as well as the accomodation
ratios of ALMP.
                                                          
40 Note that negative effect means here a reduction of the job seeker rate.
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5.4 Dynamic Labour Demand – Effects on Regular Employment
A regional labour demand equation may be specified as
1 3 1 3
1 1 2 3 1 4 5 6 1 7 1
reg reg
it it it it it it it it it i itn n y w Z p p p p S                          (7)
where small types denote logarithm (see ISSERMAN et al., 1986) .41 regitn  represents the
level of regular employment in local area i normalised with total labour force.42 ity is
the regional output (gross value added), 1itZ   are variables describing the structure of
the local labour market and itw  is the wage rate, measured as labour monthly wage bill
per employee in the industry. Using only industry wages results from data availability
and may be justified as follows. First, even in East Germany collective wage bargain-
ing is still relevant. Wage agreements from manufacturing sectors often serve as mod-
els for other branches. Second, the manufacturing sector has become the driving force
in the economic development in East Germany. Thus, positive employment dynamics
in the manufacturing sector are often the prerequisite for job creation in other sectors.
Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the measurement error is likely to bias the
estimated effect of itw . Unfortunately, as noted above, since data for SAS are not avail-
able up to 1997, SAS cannot not be included in the analysis. Therefore, only the effects
of JCS and PT  can be evaluated, which is indicated in (7) by the fact that only p1 and
p3 are included. p1 and p3 represent the participants in JCS and PT relative to the la-
bour force.43 S  denotes a vector of (yearly) time dummies, i  are regional fixed-
effects, and it is a white noise error term.
Equation (7) is based on restrictive assumptions concerning the production process.
Taking more factor prices into account, it would be possible to specify a more flexible
labour demand equation based on industry cost minimisation (see for example
TAYLOR, 1982). It was tried to calculate user cost of capital on district level, making
use of regional variation in tax rates and investment grants (see FRANZ and SCHALK,
1995) as well as BÜTTNER, 1999). However, no attempts to include measures for
capital user costs lead to significant parameter estimates. Therefore, only labour costs
are included and it is assumed that other factor costs are captured by the fixed regional
effects and fixed time dummies (see VAN REENEN, 1997).   
The outstanding role of the manufacturing sector in the East German regional devel-
opment is exactly the reason for introducing the proportion of manufacturing employ-
ees in 1itZ   as an explanatory variable. Further variables are the average number of
employees in manufacturing establishments, the proportion of employees in farming
and forestry, the proportion of highly skilled employees (university or polytechnic de-
gree) in total employment, and the population density. Descriptive statistics can be
found in Table A3 in the Appendix.
                                                          
41 Comparable equations in time-series frameworks have been estimated by KRAFT (1998) as well as by
JOHNSON and TOMOLA (1977).
42 This normalisation seems to be necessary in order to eliminate effects due to differences in the size of
the regional labour markets. Normalisation with the regional population does not change the results to a
large extent.
43 Also specifications where ALMP is introduced as accomodation ratios (see last section) are estimated.
The results change only marginally. Results are available by the author on request.
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Using equation (7) the effects of ALMPs are estimated at a given output level which
implies that productivity effects of ALMP are eliminated and pure crowding-out ef-
fects are estimated. Furthermore, possible regional multiplier-effects due to increased
regional purchasing power as assumed by BLIEN et al. (2002) are not taken into ac-
count. Therefore, equation (7) is additionally estimated omitting the output variable in
order to test whether there are significant employment effects of ALMPs via the re-
gional output.
The estimation is performed again with the ARRELANO and BOND (1991) GMM es-
timator. Since there are now 101 local areas (districts) and five time periods (years),
the two-step estimator is applied. Since the two-step estimator is known to lead to an
underestimation of the standard errors, for the preferred specification also the one-step
results (with robust standard errors) are displayed. Note, that the first-differencing and
the lagged dependent variable each lead to a reduction of one period. The resulting
number of periods is therefore three.
The estimation results can be seen in Table 5. In column (1) of Table 5 all variables
except for the lagged endogenous variable are treated as strictly exogenous. An unex-
pected result is the positive coefficient of the wage variable, which is, however, not
statistically significant. There are at least three explanations for this result: As the vari-
able includes only the wage for the industry, the measurement error may bias the esti-
mated effect towards zero. Employment and wages may be determined simultaneously
as suggested by some wage bargaining models. Migration between regions is not mod-
elled in the estimation. Economic theory suggests that workers migrate to states in or-
der to increase their wages, which in turn raises employment (see TOPEL, 1986). For
these reasons wages cannot be treated as uncorrelated with the error term and are,
therefore, treated as endogenous and instrumented with its lagged levels. The Sargan
test in column (1) indicates that this specification is to be preferred. Note that in all
specifications, except the first one in column (1), the null hypothesis of valid instru-
ment cannot be rejected. Furthermore, the null hypothesis of no second-order serial
correlation cannot be rejected in any specification. In the specification column (3) also
the ALMP variables are treated as endogenous and are instrumented by lagged levels.
In the specification in column (4) the proportion of votes for liberal-conservative par-
ties is used as an additional instrument. Other possible instrumental variables dis-
cussed in section 5.1 do not cause an increase in the Sargan test statistic. In column (5)
the results of the one-step estimator with robust standard errors are depicted.44 In col-
umn (6) the regional output is omitted using the two step-estimator.45 It can be seen
that the other coefficients are hardly affected.
In most specifications the lagged proportion of manufacturing sector employees have
positive impact which is in line with the hypothesis that this sector is the driving-force
for economic upturn in East Germany. Also a higher share of highly-skilled workers
has a positive impact which underlines the importance of human capital for regional
development. The average number of employees per establishment in manufacturing
                                                          
44 The Sargan test for the one-step specification comes again from the corresponding homoscedastic esti-
mator.
45 The results of the one-step estimator are comparable. Results are available on request by the author.
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has a negative impact which is in line with previous results (see BÜTTNER, 1999 for
further discussions).
The resulting long-term elasticities are depicted in Table 6. As already discussed, the
wage elasticity is negative in specification where the wage variable is instrumented.
After instrumentation, the long-term wage elasticity is approximately between 12 and
17 per cent, which seems to be – given that the public sector is included – reasonable.
Likewise reasonable is the long-term output elasticity which is between 37 and 44 per
cent.
The estimated effects of ALMP on regular employment can be summarised as fol-
lows. JCS have a negative long-term effect on regular employment: A long-term in-
crease of the participants in JCS by 1 per cent leads to a reduction of regular employ-
ment by 0.06 up to 0.1 per cent, which is moderate in comparison to magnitudes found
in other studies on subsidised employment in the public sector (see CALMFORS et al.
2001). PT seems to have no significant long-term effects. There seems to be a negative
contemporaneous effect in t, which vanishes in t-1. Column (6) indicates that exclud-
ing output does not change the results to a large extent. This may be interpreted as evi-
dence that ALMP has no strong employment effects via the regional output.
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Table 5: Demand for Regular Labour in East German Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Two-step GMM
all variables ex-
ogenous
Two-step GMM
IV for wages
Two-step GMM
IV for ALMP and
wages
Two-step GMM
IV for ALMP and
wages
- external IV
One-step GMM –
IV for ALMP and
wages
- external IV
Two-step GMM
IV for ALMP and
wages
- external IV
no output
Variable Param. t-value Param. t-value Param. t-value Param. t-value Param. t-value
(robust)
Param. t-value
nit-1 0.139 1.09 0.156 2.02 0.112 1.88 0.116 2.08 0.109 1.71 0.158 2.66
 yit 0.340 3.50 0.366 3.61 0.387 4.03 0.392 3.99 0.326 3.52 –
wit 0.059 1.25 -0.099 -1.92 -0.123 -2.39 -0.117 -2.62 -0.154 -2.07 -0.133 -3.11
Prop. of Agriculture (t-1) -0.402 -1.79 -0.258 -1.21 -0.095 -0.41 -0.073 -0.30 -0.044 -0.09 -0.006 -0.02
Prop. of Manufacturing (t-1) 0.584 2.41 0.835 3.34 0.579 2.42 0.500 2.41 0.704 2.32 1.002 4.94
Prop. of highly skilled (t-1) 1.432 3.37 1.225 2.90 0.929 2.32 0.913 2.36 0.704 2.32 0.493 1.27
Av. no. of workers establ.* 10-3  (t-1) -0.193 -1.13 -0.410 -2.65 -0.449 -3.77 -0.487 -4.35 -0.438 -2.06 -0.125 -4.78
Population Density (t-1) -0.060 -2.37 -0.061 -3.41 -0.063 -4.75 -0.060 -4.62 -0.055 -1.39 -0.074 -3.89
jcs (t) 0.017 1.39 0.010 0.92 -0.008 -0.44 -0.013 -0.71 0.001 -0.01 -0.024 -1.63
jcs (t-1) -0.014 -1.39 -0.020 -2.10 -0.070 -4.56 -0.072 -4.89 -0.046 -2.14 -0.058 -4.68
fbw (t) 0.010 0.67 0.021 1.38 -0.037 -1.08 -0.059 -2.01 -0.036 -0.69 -0.043 -1.40
fbw (t-1) 0.009 0.79 0.006 0.59 0.021 1.18 0.025 1.51 0.004 0.16 0.068 3.40
Year 1999 -0.005 -0.95 -0.013 -2.51 -0.008 -1.08 -0.010 -1.30 -0.003 -0.2 -0.014 -2.15
Year 2000 -0.022 -1.71 -0.034 -2.72 -0.043 -2.05 -0.047 -2.30 -0.029 -0.79 -0.039 -4.52
Constant -0.015 -1.73 -0.005 -0.57 0.001 0.06 0.001 0.06 -0.006 -0.39 0.001 0.22
Sargan test, p-value 0.0159 0.2254 0.5038 0.5627 0.7648 0.3341
1st order serial correlation, p-value 0.8952 0.7449 0.8110 0.8068 0.8471 0.7747
2st order serial correlation, p-value 0.6322 0.7403 0.7962 0.5595 0.9600 0.5713
No. of Observations (N, T) 101, 3 101, 3 101, 3 101, 3 101, 3 101, 3
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Table 6: Estimated Long-Run Elasticities (t-values)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all variables
exogeneous
IV for wages IV for ALMP
and wages
IV for ALMP
and wages
- external IV
IV for ALMP
and wages
- external IV
IV for ALMP
and wages
- external IV
no output
output 0.395 0.434 0.436 0.443 0.366               –
(3.23) (3.66) (4.04) (4.03) (3.29)
wage 0.069 -0.117 -0.138 -0.133 -0.173 -0.158
(1.20) (-2.05) (-2.54) (-2.84) (-2.40) (-3.50)
jcs (t) 0.020 0.012 -0.009 -0.015 -0.001 -0.029
(1.36) (0.92) (-0.44) (-0.72) (-0.01) (-1.67)
pt (t) 0.012 0.025 -0.042 -0.066 -0.041 -0.051
(0.67) (1.36) (-1.10) (-2.04) (-0.69) (-1.41)
jcs (t) + jcs (t-1) 0.003 -0.011 -0.088 -0.096 -0.052 -0.098
(0.16) (-0.55) (-3.24) (-3.45) (-1.95) (-4.10)
pt (t) + pt (t-1) 0.022 0.032 -0.018 -0.038 -0.036 0.029
(0.95) (1.40) (-0.52) (-1.26) (-0.08) (1.00)
Notes: Calculated from the estimation results in Table 5. The columns correspond to the columns in
Table 5.
6 Conclusion
Due to potential indirect effects of ALMP on non-participants, evaluation of ALMP
using aggregate data in addition to micro data is crucial. The larger a programme is,
the more likely are indirect effects to occur. For this reason evaluation based on aggre-
gate data seems to be essential in East Germany, where a large proportion of the labour
force participate in ALMPs.
Similar to microeconometric studies, aggregate evaluation studies are associated with
fundamental methodological problems: ALMP cannot be treated as exogenous with
respect to the local labour market condition. This has to be taken into account in order
to obtain an unbiased estimate of effect of ALMP.
In this paper the three largest active labour market policy (ALMP) programmes – job
creation schemes (JCS), structural adjustment schemes (SAS) and public training
measures (PT) – are evaluated. JCS and SAS are subsidised jobs, mostly implemented
in the non-profit sector. The analysis of the regional allocation rule of the funding of
ALMPs reveals that ALMP cannot be treated as exogenous with respect to the local
labour market situation which makes the use of suitable econometric approaches nec-
essary. Three different approaches based on different econometric techniques for panel
data (GMM and two-stage least squares) and two different regional data sets are used.
The augmented matching function indicates negative effects of JCS on matching ef-
ficiency and no significant effects of PT and SAS. This result is in line with available
microeconometric research. A reduced form approach based on the Beveridge curve
does not indicate any long-term effects of ALMPs on regional job seeker rates. There
are some short-term effects indicating that SAS reduces transitionally the job seeker
rate. A possible explanation is that it may reduce average wage costs in the short-run
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and lead therefore to a temporary stabilisation of employment. However, more re-
search seems to be necessary into this issue. Dynamic labour demand estimations,
based on district level data, indicate that PT has no effects on employment and JCS
leads to displacement of regular employment.
Of course, deriving political implications based on the empirical evidence in this pa-
per seems not to be appropriate. However, taking all the unpleasant results of available
micro studies into account, one can state that a radical reform of the East German
ALMP and especially of JCS seems to be urgent. An interesting question which may
provide additional political implications is how the differences in the results of JCS
and SAS can be explained. This is, however, a topic for further research. Another issue
for further research is to take labour market participation, migration, and spill-over
effects within more structural models into account.
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Appendix
Table A1: Sample Statistics Beveridge Curve Approach (non-weighted, percentages)
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Rate of open unemployment 17.88 2.68 11.70 26.01
JSR 23.01 3.49 15.82 33.01
Short-time workers relative to labour force 0.41 0.51 0.02 8.36
Accomodation ratio JCS 6.59 2.77 1.618 19.07
Accomodation ratio SAS 4.25 2.08 0.152 12.52
Accomodation ratio PT 7.74 1.39 4.172 12.27
Notes: Non-weighted sample statistic for the specification (1) in Table A6. 35 monthly LEOA data from
February 2000 until January 2003.
Table A2: Sample Statistics Matching Function (non-weighted, percentages)
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Inflows into Employment (all types)* 4.70  1.18 2.37 7.72
Inflows into JCS and SAS* 0.26 0.13 0.05 0.80
Open unemployment* 17.44 2.59 12.11 23.67
Registered vacancies* 0.85 0.29 0.27 1.73
Participants in JCS* 1.72 0.75 0.47 5.03
Participants in SAS* 1.03 0.48 0.23 2.30
Participants in PT* 1.84 0.44 0.94 3.07
Prop. of young in labour force (< 25) * 12.66 1.02 9.60 14.88
Prop. of older unemployed ( 55) 28.43 2.99 20.97 35.02
Prop. of female unemployed 51.88 3.53 41.60 59.16
Prop. of foreign unemployed 1.99 2.72 0.69 17.62
Prop. of unemployed with UB 45.97 4.97 34.84 63.13
Notes: Non-weighted sample statistic for the specification (5) in Table 2. 35 quarterly LEOA data from
the second quarter 2000 until the first quarter 2002.  * relative to total labour force.
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Table A3: Sample Statistics Demand for Regular Labour (non-weighted, percentages)
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Employment (total) * 69.48 11.54 54.37 81.10
Monthly Wages per Employee in Industry (Euro) 1981.83 344.76 1238.0 4384.32
Prop. of employees in farming 4.32 2.69 0.22 13.82
Prop. of employees in manufacturing 31.88 7.32 12.75 46.13
Prop. of highly skilled employees (university or poly-
technic degree)
8.83 3.07 4.00 22.5
Average number of employees per establishment in
manufacturing
81.77 25.38 42.74 215.86
Population density 327.95 428.68 40.86 2459.76
Votes for liberal-conservative parties (CDU plus FDP) 43.26 10.25 14.8 66.6
Notes: Non-weighted sample statistic for all specifications in Table 5. *relative to total labour force.
Table A4: Instrumenting ALMP – First-Differenced (SUR) Estimation
jcs sas pt
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Unemployment rate (t-2) 2.064 9.18 0.041 0.26 0.097 0.91
Prop. of young in labour force (t-1) 9.375 1.51 1.142 0.24 0.850 0.3
Prop. of young in labour force (t-2) -10.252 -1.89 -9.171 -2.16 3.537 1.37
Prop. of older unemployed (t-1) -1.561 -1.26 -1.593 -1.78 -0.870 -1.49
Prop. of older unemployed (t-2) 5.733 4.72 -1.892 -2.12 1.028 1.77
Prop. of foreign unemployed (t-1) 12.123 1.52 7.760 2.04
Prop. of foreign unemployed (t-2) 18.696 2.26 3.430 0.87
Prop. of female unemployed (t-1) -2.604 -3.29 -0.766 -1.33 0.100 0.27
Prop. of female unemployed (t-2) -2.607 -3.29 -0.387 -0.64 0.361 0.94
Prop. of unemployed with UB (t-1) 0.068 0.11 1.048 2.42 -0.069 -0.24
Prop. of unemployed with UB (t-2) -0.959 -1.56 0.277 0.62 -1.189 -4.05
Aggregate Unemployment Rate (t-1) -1.629 -2.08 2.722 4.47 -0.463 -1.21
Aggregate Unemployment Rate (t-2) -2.012 -2.66 0.277 0.41 -0.869 -2.33
Aggregate Vacancy Rate (t-1) 0.583 1.44 -0.652 -2.05 0.010 0.05
Aggregate Vacancy Rate (t-2) -0.810 -1.96 -0.541 -1.42 -0.362 -1.74
Prop. of welfare recipients in the pop. (t-1) -0.007 -1.83 -0.003 -1.28 -0.003 -1.59
Votes for liberal-conservative parties (t-1) -0.029 -1.35 0.022 1.42 0.003 0.25
Votes for liberal-conservative parties x trend (t-1) -0.001 -1.13 -0.002 -6.2 -0.001 -5.12
Welfare recip. x liberal-conservative x trend (t-1) 0.000 2.03 0.000 1.65 0.000 1.54
linear trend -0.100 -2.38
Quarter 2 -0.049 -0.32 0.212 1.88 0.123 1.69
Quarter 3 -0.119 -0.97 0.497 4.60 0.136 2.22
Quarter 4 0.031 0.32 0.589 7.42 -0.023 -0.48
Prop. of foreigner in labour force (t-1) -9.108 -0.55 15.21 1.4
Prop. of foreigner in labour force (t-2) -28.98 -1.49 12.33 0.97
Prop. of women in labour force (t-1) 9.365 1.84
Prop. of women in labour force (t-1) -4.651 -1.06
Breusch-Pagan test of independence (p-value) 2(3) =  13.668 (0.0034)
Correlation matrix of residuals jcs sas pt
jcs 1.0000
sas 0.1138 1.0000
pt 0.1396 -0.010 1.000
No. of observations (N, T) 35 ,8 35, 8 35, 8
R² 0.4875 0.6096 0.2369
Notes: First-stage estimation for column (5) in Table 2.
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Table A5: Unit Root Tests for Monthly Panel Data
lags jsrit vit jcsit sasit ptit
ADF C0.05 ADF C0.05 ADF C0.05 ADF C0.05 ADF C0.05
1 425.330 21.412 465.282 21.412 675.743 21.412 453.369 21.412  631.186  21.412
2 933.429 21.578 622.853 21.578 431.659 21.578 208.022 21.578 1248.525  21.578
3 596.918 21.751 964.947 21.751 537.655 21.751 234.070 21.751  613.626  21.751
4 466.528 21.931 729.837 21.931 435.921 21.931 351.964 21.931  530.415  21.931
5 416.538 22.120 568.135 22.120 396.766 22.120 591.281 22.120  627.145  22.120
6 512.167 22.318 581.823 22.318 371.777 22.318 540.462 22.318  654.134  22.318
7 449.439 22.525 681.206 22.525 289.996 22.525 347.501 22.525  550.566  22.525
8 270.361 22.744 634.840 22.744 303.708 22.744 206.179 22.744  600.964  22.744
9 357.845 22.974 446.763 22.974 300.550 22.974 267.606 22.974  461.321  22.974
10 564.350 23.218 432.073 23.218 315.358 23.218 263.841 23.218  350.229  23.218
11 964.569 23.476 289.150 23.476 462.232 23.476 291.737 23.476  307.581  23.476
12 741.916 23.751 424.444 23.751 382.194 23.751 400.750 23.751  429.615  23.751
Notes: ADF is the test statistic of the augmented Dickey Fuller Test for panel data as proposed by
SARNO and TAYLOR (1998) and TAYLOR and SARNO (1998). C0.05 is the 5 per cent critical value, the null
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if ADF< C0.05.
Table A6: Estimation Results – Augmented Beveridge Curve
(1) (2) (3)
With Short-Time Work-
ers
three lagged levels for
instrumentation
Param. t-value
(robust)
Param. t-value
(robust)
Param. t-value
(robust)
jsr (t-1) 0.980 25.94 0.870 14.87 0.982 25.98
jsr (t-2) -0.076 -1.52 -0.025 -0.29 -0.076 -1.56
jsr (t-3) -0.074 -2.06 -0.241 -1.57 -0.074 -2.08
jsr (t-4) -0.026 -0.52 0.053 0.70 -0.026 -0.54
jsr (t-5) 0.026 0.58 0.134 1.02 0.026 0.56
jsr (t-6) -0.031 -0.63 -0.047 -0.73 -0.031 -0.66
jsr (t-7) 0.045 0.92 -0.007 -0.13 0.045 0.95
jsr (t-8) -0.053 -1.40 0.001 0.02 -0.053 -1.46
jsr (t-9) -0.073 -1.59 -0.125 -2.70 -0.073 -1.53
jsr (t-10) 0.178 4.68 0.225 4.63 0.178 4.66
jsr (t-11) 0.137 3.67 0.048 0.93 0.137 3.69
jsr (t-12) -0.101 -3.64 0.008 0.21 -0.101 -3.62
v (t-1) -0.009 -3.25 0.001 0.13 -0.009 -3.29
v (t-2) 0.008 3.13 0.001 0.24 0.008 3.16
v (t-3) 0.002 0.64 -0.005 -1.13 0.002 0.68
v (t-4) -0.005 -2.06 0.000 -0.03 -0.005 -2.03
v (t-5) 0.004 1.67 0.002 0.36 0.004 1.65
v (t-6) 0.002 0.75 -0.002 -0.40 0.002 0.73
Prop. of disabled unempl. (t-1) -0.034 -0.07 0.108 0.14 -0.034 -0.09
Prop. of disabled unempl. (t-2) 0.868 1.27 1.535 1.34 0.868 1.27
Prop. of disabled unempl. (t-3) -0.669 -1.12 -2.295 -2.14 -0.669 -1.14
Prop. of disabled unempl. (t-4) 0.376 0.79 1.937 2.00 0.376 0.76
Prop. of disabled unempl. (t-5) -0.470 -0.95 -1.100 -1.36 -0.470 -0.93
Prop. of disabled unempl. (t-6) 0.163 0.57 0.643 1.23 0.163 0.52
Prop. of blue-collar unempl. (t-1) 0.151 1.44 0.320 1.70 0.151 1.45
Prop. of blue-collar unempl. (t-2) -0.211 -1.27 -0.047 -0.15 -0.211 -1.26
Prop. of blue-collar unempl. (t-3) 0.069 0.48 -0.265 -1.00 0.069 0.43
Prop. of blue-collar unempl. (t-4) -0.401 -2.39 -0.122 -0.47 -0.401 -2.33
Prop. of blue-collar unempl. (t-5) -0.014 -0.09 -0.171 -0.69 -0.014 -0.05
Prop. of blue-collar unempl. (t-6) 0.087 0.85 0.028 0.15 0.087 0.86
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Table A6 – continued
Prop. of young in labour force (t-1) -0.611 -2.35 -0.730 -2.08 -0.611 -2.38
Prop. of young in labour force (t-2) 0.570 1.97 0.489 1.22 0.570 1.95
Prop. of young in labour force (t-3) -0.414 -1.26 -0.310 -0.72 -0.414 -1.25
Prop. of young in labour force (t-4) -0.262 -0.77 -0.429 -0.76 -0.262 -0.73
Prop. of young in labour force (t-5) -0.133 -0.34 -0.178 -0.33 -0.133 -0.33
Prop. of young in labour force (t-6) 0.594 2.27 0.810 2.79 0.594 2.24
Prop. of female unempl. (t-1) -0.154 -1.72 -0.139 -1.02 -0.154 -1.71
Prop. of female unempl. (t-2) 0.063 0.43 0.275 0.93 0.063 0.47
Prop. of female unempl. (t-3) 0.218 1.61 -0.122 -0.28 0.218 1.64
Prop. of female unempl. (t-4) -0.282 -1.70 -0.227 -0.62 -0.282 -1.73
Prop. of female unempl. (t-5) -0.351 -2.79 -0.247 -1.00 -0.351 -2.72
Prop. of female unempl. (t-6) 0.316 3.04 0.347 2.70 0.316 3.07
Prop. of foreign unempl. (t-1) 0.407 1.01 0.930 1.49 0.423 1.04
Prop. of foreign unempl. (t-2) 0.106 0.19 0.033 0.04 0.106 0.16
Prop. of foreign unempl. (t-3) -0.177 -0.29 -0.116 -1.29 -0.177 -0.31
Prop. of foreign unempl. (t-4) 0.163 0.29 0.104 0.97 0.163 0.11
Prop. of foreign unempl. (t-5) 0.156 0.25 0.308 0.34 0.156 0.25
Prop. of foreign unempl. (t-6) 0.074 0.16 -0.928 -1.27 0.074 0.14
acccr jcs (t) -0.001 -0.27 -0.009 -1.18 -0.001 -0.22
acccr jcs (t-1) 0.000 0.02 0.012 1.01 0.000 0.01
acccr jcs (t-2) 0.007 1.24 0.012 1.07 0.007 1.25
acccr jcs (t-3) -0.009 -1.81 -0.033 -1.73 -0.009 -1.83
acccr jcs (t-4) 0.004 0.80 0.032 1.44 0.004 0.76
acccr jcs (t-5) -0.004 -0.81 -0.018 -1.47 -0.004 -0.82
acccr jcs (t-6) 0.003 0.43 0.012 0.97 0.003 0.42
acccr jcs (t-7) 0.004 0.86 -0.007 -0.78 0.004 0.84
acccr jcs (t-8) -0.006 -1.53 -0.017 -2 -0.006 -1.52
acccr jcs (t-9) 0.002 0.41 0.014 2.27 0.002 0.42
acccr jcs (t-10) 0.005 0.89 -0.003 -0.5 0.005 0.96
acccr jcs (t-11) -0.004 -0.71 0.007 1.07 -0.004 -0.72
acccr jcs (t-12) -0.003 -0.82 -0.006 -1.35 -0.003 -0.84
acccr sas (t) -0.001 -0.21 0.026 1.83 -0.001 -0.25
acccr sas (t-1) -0.006 -1.07 -0.055 -2.68 -0.006 -1.02
acccr sas (t-2) 0.002 0.72 0.012 1.35 0.002 0.78
acccr sas (t-3) -0.004 -0.92 0.000 -0.04 -0.004 -0.95
acccr sas (t-4) -0.005 -1.11 0.015 0.85 -0.005 -1.16
acccr sas (t-5) 0.011 2.89 -0.011 -0.62 0.011 2.88
acccr sas (t-6) -0.002 -0.35 -0.003 -0.37 -0.002 -0.31
acccr sas (t-7) -0.001 -0.1 0.006 0.64 -0.001 -0.15
acccr sas (t-8) 0.009 2.21 0.020 1.79 0.009 2.23
acccr sas (t-9) -0.002 -0.45 -0.013 -1.47 -0.002 -0.46
acccr sas (t-10) -0.007 -1.65 -0.002 -0.29 -0.007 -1.64
acccr sas (t-11) -0.007 -0.99 -0.005 -0.54 -0.007 -0.97
acccr sas (t-12) 0.010 2.07 0.002 0.27 0.010 2.05
acccr pt (t) -0.047 -5.44 -0.045 -4.89 -0.047 -5.40
acccr pt (t-1) 0.059 5.16 0.044 3.23 0.059 5.11
acccr pt (t-2) -0.011 -1.28 -0.003 -0.25 -0.011 -1.23
acccr pt (t-3) -0.001 -0.21 -0.016 -1.73 -0.001 -0.22
acccr pt (t-4) -0.010 -0.97 0.012 1.01 -0.010 -0.95
acccr pt (t-5) 0.015 1.79 0.002 0.16 0.015 1.74
acccr pt (t-6) -0.016 -2.00 0.011 0.74 -0.016 -2.02
acccr pt (t-7) -0.003 -0.29 -0.038 -2.17 -0.003 -0.24
acccr pt (t-8) 0.019 2.36 0.046 2.75 0.019 2.33
acccr pt (t-9) -0.018 -2.19 -0.035 -1.98 -0.018 -2.24
acccr pt (t-10) 0.016 1.77 0.019 0.97 0.016 1.78
acccr pt (t-11) -0.007 -0.88 -0.012 -0.76 -0.007 -0.85
acccr pt (t-12) 0.004 0.94 0.006 0.86 0.004 0.96
ln national unemployment rate (t-1) 0.397 8.38 0.429 7.09 0.397 8.35
ln national unemployment rate (t-2) -0.271 -3.35 -0.367 -3.88 -0.271 -3.33
ln national unemployment rate (t-3) -0.030 -0.31 0.128 0.89 -0.035 -0.32
ln national unemployment rate (t-4) -0.012 -0.14 0.064 0.45 -0.012 -0.15
ln national unemployment rate (t-5) -0.228 -2.56 -0.187 -1.55 -0.228 -2.51
ln national unemployment rate (t-6) 0.153 1.67 0.011 0.10 0.153 1.66
ln national vacancy rate (t-1) -0.015 -0.17 -0.121 -1.08 -0.015 -0.15
ln national vacancy rate (t-2) -0.046 -0.38 0.145 0.85 -0.046 -0.33
ln national vacancy rate (t-3) 0.225 3.32 0.121 1.09 0.225 3.31
ln national vacancy rate (t-4) -0.360 -2.93 -0.313 -2.32 -0.360 -2.94
ln national vacancy rate (t-5) 0.166 1.22 0.143 0.99 0.166 1.21
ln national vacancy rate (t-6) 0.016 0.19 0.027 0.24 0.014 0.80
Constant 0.000 -0.37 0.000 0.14 0.000 -0.35
Sargan test 2 (p-value) 1180.80    (1.0000) 1199.72 (1.0000) 1180.80 (1.0000)
1st order serial correlation, p-value 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000
2st order serial correlation, p-value 0.3403 0.7438 0.3403
No. of observations (N, T) 35, 37 35, 37 35, 37
Notes: 11 monthly dummies are included but not reported.
